Abstract: The present paper discusses the evolution of legal discourse as it is happening in a number of well-publicized American cases. Discussions of the First and Second Amendments to the US Constitution in relation to freedom of the press and the freedom to carry and use arms are followed by a general discussion of what it means to have a legal text considered as binding across the centuries. It is shown that legal discourse is pragmatically oriented, that is to say, its application and evolution are subject to the general evolution of society and its members, the people interacting with, and interpreting that discourse; this evolution is thus a typical pragmatically relevant process. Over the course of the centuries and years, accumulative gradual developments have often ended up totally altering the interpretation of certain laws and statutes -sometimes to the advantage, sometimes to the disadvantage of underprivileged segments of society, such as the Black population and people of different sexual orientations. The paper will discuss some characteristic historic and contemporary cases of this development.
Introduction: The law, values, and interests
The law has sometimes been identified as the embodiment of societal discourse: 'jelled', or 'frozen discourse', to use a Marxian-inspired expression. 1 As to values, societal discourse is what makes the community of humans function: in discourse, we not only express our own values, but the values that are embodied in society's institutions and reflected in our legal texts.
This embodiment has two aspects: the one is the way it preserves the values that have been delivered through the generations; the other is the way it steers and inspires the competitors in the human struggle to 'make a living' in the respective societies they belong to.
As to interests, interest is commonly seen as what drives the individual to action. But interests cannot be exercised except in a common societal context; without society, our interests could only survive as curious objects, similar to the worthless bills issued by an entity like the central bank of a failed, no longer existent state.
However, interests only realize an individual's values inasmuch as they are sanctioned and supported by society; which is why they cannot be ripped out of "society's fabric" (Mey 1985: 221 ff.) to exist in a kind of antagonistic vacuumsomething which the US political journalist Evan Osnos recently has characterized, referring to then US Presidential candidate Donald Trump's multiple expostulations, as a state of affairs in which for Trump, "interests have no place for values" -a view that reinforces, even exacerbates, the familiar neoliberalistic tendency to place individual interests ahead of whatever values society may represent (Osnos 2016: 41) .
Further as to values and the law, what are the values that the law can embody? Clearly, a simplistic value dichotomy along the lines of 'True/False' leads to the same antagonism that I alluded to above. What is needed for the laws, as 'frozen' but 'thawable' discourse, is to calibrate the individual interests against the values held by society-at-large, while at the same time allowing the former to interact dialectically with the latter, thereby making it possible to maintain stability in change by adjusting the values expressed in the legal text and relating them to the commonly accepted discourse of a society in constant evolution. (Poster case: the way legal definitions and juridical determinations concerning gay rights and gay practices have continuously evolved in many societies over the past half century).
Discourse and society
In Foucauldian terms, discourse is the practice of making sense. This practice involves more than merely understanding and interpreting utterances; 'making sense' is an activity, an active creation of meaning, as a "practice that systematically forms the objects of which it speaks" (Foucault 1972: 44) .
As to society, it is the natural 'matrix' of any discourse(s), inasmuch as the latter are societally founded and socially exercised. The 'sense-making' that discourse implies can only be practiced in a community of 'discursants': people who interact, using language and other communicative means. Society is the creative space in which Foucault's 'objects' are constituted and transformed: the practice of discourse is the practice of society, the primordial discursive space (Foucault 1972: 32) .
Legal discourse
The Latin word for 'law is lex. As the other forms of this substantive show, the word's root form is leg-(like in the genitive leg-is, and the word's other cases). Hence the relation to the Latin verb legere (originally meaning 'to collect, gather' and then 'to read' (like 'gathering letters to extract their meaning') becomes clear.
2 From Latin to early French, the word emerged as (la) lei, or loi; it is this latter form which is at the basis of he word, when finally adopted from the language of the Anglo-Normans into English, following the Conquest. Legal discourse, in the sense of interpreting and commenting on the law, is this logical extension of the concept of law itself. In order to be practiced, the legal 'readings' (opinions and verdicts) had to be collected and codified, just like it had been done for collected corpora such as the Byzantine emperor Justinian's Codex, incorporating the earlier Roman Civil Code into his Corpus Iuris Civilis of 529 AD; here, too, belong later compilations such as Corpus Iuris Canonici ('canon law', 1140 AD onward, and first codified in 1580 by Pope Gregory XIII), or the well-known, Napoleonic civil code of 1804 ('Code Napoléon', with its various legal subdomains such as the civil, penal, criminal, or commercial codes), which still is in force in many European countries that used to be under the sway of the French Emperor during his ten year reign.
An interesting further aspect of the importance of legal discourse is illustrated by the haste with which hopeful and incoming, power-greedy politicians have endeavored to influence the current legal discourse in their favor, often before, or otherwise immediately upon their access to power. Thus, whereas Napoleon I was crowned Emperor in December of 1804, his perhaps most important earlier practice of legal discourse as 'First Consul' has been to oversee the work on the 'code' named after him, and have it finally adopted in May 1804, six months before his official accession to the throne. Likewise Adolf Hitler, made Chancellor of the German Reich on 30 January of 1933, started his discourse of legal terror by issuing the first anti-Jewish laws in April of that year, barring Jewish persons from the legal profession and continuing on to the infamous Nürnberg decrees, which effectively legalized the incipient de-nationalization ('Ausbürgerung') of the Jewish German population, in September of 1935.
4 Truth, pragmatics and the law: the 2016 Comey incident
In early November of 2016, during the last week of the US presidential election campaign, FBI director James Comey made an interesting announcement. He had presumably found further documentation of illegal use of email by (then) Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, one of the two forerunners in the current election. Earlier, there had been a lot of talk about how Secretary Clinton had been careless in handling classified information by having it on her personal email server; these discussions subsequently subsided (except in the ranks of the opposing candidate, Donald Trump), when in July, Director Comey published his conclusion that the law had not been broken, and there were no grounds for a further investigation. Even so, the opposition kept referring to the purported 'email scandals' as if they represented an incontrovertible truth. In this context, the new 'findings' by Comey (which he a few days later had to retract) proved to be an invaluable boost to the Trump campaign, to the degree that many pundits, in their post-election comments, attributed Clinton's defeat in large measure to the timing of these alleged 'new' findings of her carelessness in fulfilling her duties as Secretary. In other words, even though the Comey findings turned out to be untrue, they were not irrelevant to the issue of who was worthy to be the next President of the United States.
While the debates about the Comey findings turned mostly on the question whether they were 'true' or not, from the viewpoint of pragma-legal discourse the 'truth value' of the allegations is of minor importance; the relevant features of the Comey intermezzo were first of all, its timing and placement. In the heated atmosphere of the final pre-election days, almost 'anything went', as long as it was strategically apposite. What Comey uttered was probably neither true nor false; he just intimated that he had found something that could be of interest. What the public lashed on to, however, was whether there was any 'truth' in what these findings were about. That there was none, did not diminish their pragmatic effect.
From a legal-discursive point of view, one could argue that disseminating a finding which is neither true nor false until proven, is of no legal interest.
Pragmatically speaking, however, the timing of divulging the findings falls under the domain of legality: spreading unfounded rumors, for instance, is forbidden by the laws, and can be punished by the courts. Which shows (and this is the main point of relevance here), that in a pragmatic view of discourse (including legal discourse), the (intended) 'perlocutionary' effect of one's 'locutions' is indeed a measure of their legality. Pragma-legally speaking, any utterance has to be considered in relation to the space and time in which it is located; in addition, its value has to be determined, both subjectively (in relation to the interests of the utterer) and objectively (in relation to the recipients' interest). Value is intimately related to the question of interest; this will be discussed in the next section.
The discourse of interest
The term 'interest' itself goes back to a Latin verbal expression (mei) interest '[something] is of value, is interesting (to me)'. The valued item may be a thing, a person, an institution, as in rei publicae interesse putavi 'I considered it to be a concern ('interest') of the Republic' (Cicero, in his apologetic essay De domo sua); it can even be an abstract notion like 'the law'. Here, it behooves us to remember Roger Fowler's remark that "all objects, all knowledge are constructs" (Fowler 1981: 33) in the Foucauldian sense referred to above; in particular, discourse is a practice, constructed by the social and political world (Fowler 1991) . The important thing here is to identify those 'constructors' of our common discourse, as it appears in its various guises: political, commercial, mediatized, medical, legal, and so on.
Here, a further glance at the Latin expression provides a hint. The original construction of interest is with the 'objective genitive' mei (and not with the 'dative of interest' mihi, as one might expect). Behind this grammatical distinction, a 'real world' difference may be detected: the constructor of my interest has me as his object, I am being 'objectified' by this interest. Rather than just being an 'interested' person, I am subdued to the interest of the constructors. Which boils down in plain talk that also my discourse is an 'object', a construct, made up by the constructors of the societal discourse at large.
This discourse of society is eminently expressed in the language of the media. Media discourse is not a mere a conveyor of 'news'; it expresses the views and intentions of the institutions and organizations that support and control the media discourse of our society. As Statham points out, following earlier work by Machin and van Leeuwen (2007) , we have to "relate textual effects back to their institutional, and essentially ideological, foundations. It is recognised that organisational procedures that are prevalent in the media have more than just practical effects [,] but also wield significant influence over language, and in this way contribute to the maintenance of constructed ideologies through established discourse practices." (Statham 2016: 26) 6 Media and 'fitness'
The famous New York Times slogan "All the news that's fit to print", which first appeared on the paper's masthead in 1896, could even today serve to characterize the discourse of the media (and not only the printed kind). The question naturally emerges what (or who) determines the 'fit'; an obvious first answer, that it is the newspaper's editor, covers only part of the issue. Newspapers survive by their circulation; and a paper's circulation is dependent on its buyers and subscribers in the same way that another of the media, television, is dependent on its performance, as rated by the 'Nielsen index', an audience measurement system first applied to television in 1950, and ever since accepted as the universal indicator of a televised program's success or failure.
With respect to the printed media (which will be the focus of the present section), the Nielsen ratings (though actually in vogue for many years after their first appearance in the domain of TV), are no longer of great interest; in particular, newspapers' national circulation rates are now determined with unique attention paid to the numbers themselves, not to the content of the media -with one exception, the 'fitness' alluded to above and further commented on in the following.
What is 'fit to print' is determined by a number of factors, some of which are shrouded in complexity and a bit of mystique, just like the one called 'newsworthiness'. It is said that a good journalist has a 'nose' for what's newsworthy; while many authors have tried to formulate criteria for what specifies this 'instinct', none have quite succeeded (for an enumeration, see Statham 2016: 27ff) . What is more important is that in our capitalist society, 'fitness' (or newsworthiness) is mostly relevant in relation to circulation: 'good news' is what is good for sales figures, 'bad news' is bad -but note that what we usually call 'bad news', like stories about environmental catastrophes or terrorist attacks, ironically seems to boost a paper's sales figures. As an early analysis by Galtung and Ruge shows, "bad news almost inevitably contains more newsworthy factors than positive stories" (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 71; quoted; Statham 2016: 28) . But what, in addition to newsworthiness, provides a newspaper with the necessary quid pro quo to keep it alive? As Statham points out, "[n]ewspapers cannot cover their costs without the input of advertising revenues and would run at a loss if they relied on cover price alone" (Statham 2016: 32;  and never mind the dwindling support from subscriptions). Newspapers need advertisers, and advertisers choose the newspapers that are in line with their own preferred ideology; which excludes news and newspapers that support 'alternative' ways of looking at the world. As a result, Statham concludes, "the unwillingness of advertisers to prop up publications that are different to their own corporate ideology effectively renders untenable the position of a publication that attempts to operate as left-wing newspaper" (Statham 2016: 32) . And, it should not be forgotten that newspaper concerns are among the biggest commercial operations that the world has seen, with budgets in the tens of billions of dollars; this alone would preclude any openings to ideologies critiquing the capitalist system that has created them, and supports the current media discourse and its societal preconditions.
Newsworthiness and legal discourse
The next question to discuss is how newsworthiness relates to the law. Specifically, what kind of legal discourse covers newsworthiness, and how does it impinge on the personal freedom of the citizens (journalists and the general public), the users (and partly creators) of this discourse? (This is where pragmatics comes in. (Mey 2001) ).
In the USA, the discussions usually take their point of departure in the First Amendment to the US Constitution (adopted and ratified by Congress in 1789). The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; …"
While this amendment does not prescribe (in the sense of the law), it makes certain actions of Congress unlawful; and by extension, it is liable to be invoked as a guideline for how to interpret the various 'freedoms from' (rather than 'freedoms to') that are enshrined in the Amendment. With respect to the press (and the media in general), this is where notions such as 'fitness to publish' and 'newsworthiness' come in.
Importantly, these notions are not in themselves legally binding; they are principles on the basis of which the judiciary enforces the application of the laws. In our case, therefore, this application is subject to the interpretation by the judges of, and their rulings on, matters dealing with the First Amendment. Especially relevant in this connection are the situations in which the potential Discourse, interests, and the law impact of a news item (its 'newsworthiness') conflicts with another right (a 'freedom from'), namely the right to privacy and the right to have one's reputation unsullied by libelous attacks from one's adversaries.
Whereas the laws concerning 'libel' are very specific, both in the US and in the UK (albeit with different emphases and practices), as to the tricky and diffuse matter of 'privacy', considered in relation to 'newsworthiness', there has been a remarkable shift in practice, following the advent and expansion of the internet as the prime locus of 'newsworthy items' (including scandalous tidbits from celebrities' personal lives, shady financial dealings by moguls, intimate details of famous people's mental and physical properties, and so on). The case of Hogan vs. Gawker proves an instance in point.
The Hogan case
Hulk Hogan was a well-known figure in the entertainment world, famous for his exploits as a wrestler and self-styled "egomaniacal celebrity" (Toobin 2016: 96) . For publicity and other, more obscure reasons, Hogan and a friend decided to swap partners in an 'open marriage' set-up; what Hogan did not realize, was that his friend secretly had taped Hogan's encounters with the friend's wife, and later 'leaked' the tapes to third parties, among others a media network called Gawker. The site's owners specialized in what they called 'radical transparency'; as the American lawyer and legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin remarks, "in less highfaluting terms, Gawker liked to show people having sex" (2016: 98).
Interestingly, when Hogan threatened to bring suit against Gawker, demanding that the tapes be withdrawn, Gawker refused, invoking the right of the press to 'free speech', meaning: the uninhibited right to publish anything 'newsworthy', however scandalous or damaging to a particular person's privacy. And in 2012, a federal judge in Florida ruled in favor of the network by stating that the tapes were "a subject of general interest and concern to the community" (Toobin 2016: 101) ; in other words, newsworthiness was judged to trump Hogan's right to personal privacy, in the name of the First Amendment.
However, on his appeal to the Florida State Court in Tampa, the jury reversed the federal judge's ruling and awarded Hogan damages to a total amount of $138 million. As Facebook billionaire Peter Thiel (who had, for personal reasons, offered to underwrite the legal costs of Hogan's appeal) privacy of someone's bedroom, and to hide behind the First Amendment, behind journalism -that is an insult to journalists" (Toobin 2016: 101). 9 Interest, legal discourse, and pragmatics Going back to our earlier discussion of 'interest' as the deciding value for newsworthy journalism, there seems to have occurred a marked shift in our attitude to 'fitness to publish' and what this entails. As late as 2001, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens ruled in a case where a radio commentator had been accused of broadcasting a private conversation which had been obtained by illegal methods. Stevens' opinion expressed the view that prosecuting the broadcaster would "threaten the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern" (quoted Toobin 2016: 102) . Considering Thiel's comment quoted above, one sees how on a current view of newsworthiness, the main question is no longer whether or not the information in question is truthful, but to which degree it may be expected to infringe upon an individual's right to privacy, in particular when it comes to divulging a person's intimate activities (like having sex), unilaterally and without permission, on the internet. In other words, the notion of 'fitness to publish' has moved its needle from the 'truth' point towards the 'private' direction of the fitness compass.
In this respect, Jeffrey Toobin asks the eminently relevant question "whether the Law, instead of treating every publication as a newspaper [with its inherent, classical definition of 'fitness to print', JM], will start to treat all publications as Web sites" (2016: 105), thereby creating a legal environment where the discourse is less attuned to forgiveness of the media, when it comes to judging the printed press's customary sources of information, and that information's newsworthiness, with respect to 'fitness to publish'.
As to the legal parameters of this and similar cases, my contention is that their time, space, and value are intrinsically pragmatically determined. By this, I mean that they must be seen in relation to the users, whose collective societal consciousness is expressed in the laws and their interpretation. Laws, despite our incessant efforts at codification, are in no way an eternal codex, valid for every space/time constellation. To take an example, the chronotope in which consuming one's enemies is a noble activity, places the modern anthropologist, acting as a participant observer, in a serious dilemma: 'To eat or not to eat' (which, given the circumstances, may translate as 'to be or not to be'). But even less outlandish scenarios occur right under our eyes. Here is a case illustrating recent US legal discourse and its 'limitations'.
An act of sexual nature involving a minor is in most countries legally defined as 'rape', that is, forced sexual contact, either physically or verbally. The difference between various legislations is mostly in the age of the persons involved: a 'rape' is considered 'statutory' in the US, if e. g., in a state such as Massachusetts or Florida, the sexually assaulted person in question is under the age of 16; by contrast, the District of Columbia imposes a stricter limit, namely 17 years. Consequently, in this respect both space (where the act was committed) and time (the age of the plaintiff) are of relevance, as it became prominently visible when a few years ago, a then US Representative (Mark Foley, R-FL) was accused of having made sexual overtures to a White House page boy who was under age at the moment of the alleged offense. The congressman, appealing to the 'space' aspect, defended himself by saying that in his home state, Florida, the particular case would not fall under the legal sanctions valid in the District of Columbia (where the US Congress is located). As to the 'time' aspect, the criterion of 'under age', he claimed, was also crucially different in the two locations.
Leaving aside the outcome of the case (Rep. Foley resigned his seat in the House "in disgrace", as the newspapers had it, on September 29, 2006), I want to concentrate on the temporal and spatial aspect of the alleged sexual act in order to determine its legal value. If Rep. Foley had just waited a few months before sending his notorious 'over-friendly' email messages to the young man in question, there would have been no offense. Due to the progression of time (as enshrined in the locally valid 'statutes of limitation'), the act would simply have lost its moral status as a transgression; this is why it is so important to pinpoint the exact time when a crime is perpetrated or an arrest is made.
(1) "the courts defer to the press for what's newsworthy" (Supreme Court Justice J.P. Stevens, as quoted by Jeffrey Toobin, in 2012) (2) "interests have no place for values" (Presidential candidate Donald Trump, as quoted by Evan Osnos, in 2016) I read the first statement as reflecting the quoted opinion of Federal Judge James D. Whittemore in the first Hogan trial: the controversial " [v] ideo [sic] is a subject of general interest and concern to the community" (Toobin 2016: 101) . In a more unpolished version, this comes out as "celebrity sex tapes -impossible to think of it as anything other than news", as Gawker co-defendant Albert J. Daulerio has it in his deposition in, and comments to, the Hogan case referred to earlier (see Toobin 2016: 99) . The legal question is of course not only if publication of 'true stories' is always permitted, but also, and mainly, whether such publication is advisable, according to the rules of common decency -rules that, though not explicitly stated by the courts, still are consonant with current societal norms of public behavior. It is these latter features that seem to have fallen by the wayside in the recent debates, and generally, in much of current thinking and feeling. When Donald Trump says that "interests have no values", he may be tapping into a reservoir of protest against the essentially defined, quasi-total freedom of speech that long has been the hallmark of liberal legal discourse (as also defended by Justice Stevens). As it is, the balance between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' may always be hard to strike; in the current debates, the equilibrium seems to have been lost, at least for the time being. As Toobin remarks, "the new President will certainly welcome a legal environment that is less forgiving of media organizations" (2016: 105); while many may see this as a way to curb the excesses of sensation journalism, it carries also the ever-present possibility of a return to a dictatorship of the press. A parallel example is that of the legal discourse covering the penalization of certain human behaviors like acts of homosexuality. It requires no big stretch of imagination to assume that the original US legislators, the Founding Fathers, never would have ruled, for instance, as their descendants did in June of 2015, that same sex marriage is legal, thereby effectively legalizing gay marriage everywhere in the United States.
5 When one compares the evolving legal discourse preceding and surrounding this ruling, one is struck by the enormous discrepancies that existed both in the actual legalizing and in the attitudes of the general public. Recall that two decades earlier, in 1996, Congress had passed a 'defense of marriage act' (DOMA), in an effort to prop up the shaky foundations of traditional marriage by ("for federal purposes") defining marriage as "the union of one man and one woman"; and even though the act was repealed in 2015, many other laws were still on the book, nationwide excoriating and condemning sexual attitudes and practices that were commonly accepted across a wide swath of the American public. What we see here is not just an 'undoing' of certain legal statutes and measures, but an evolutionary development in legal discourse, from sticking to a strict reading of the original texts to a more lenient interpretation, and eventually a rewriting, of the laws.
11 'Freedom from' vs. 'freedom to': 'Stand your ground'
From another angle, the historic differences in legal practice and discourse could be characterized as one between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. While the US Constitution, in a strict legal discourse interpretation, explicitly protects the inhabitants from coercion (a 'freedom from', hence the expression 'free speech'), this protection gradually has carried with it a belief that one is free to say anything that comes to mind (a 'freedom to'). An evolution similar to what is happening to the interpretation of the First Amendment with regard to the freedom of the press can be seen to occur in other areas as well, in particular as regards the Second Amendment, which states that "the citizens right to bears arms shall not be infringed" (a 'freedom from'); however, current interpretations often contend that this 'right', a typical 'freedom from', implies a 'freedom to', allowing citizens to not only to bear and display one's guns openly in public places (as per the recently passed 'Open Carry' law in Texas, making it the 31st state in the union to allow this), but if needed, use this right to 'stand one's ground', as Floridian legal discourse has it). 6 12 Free speech and the case of 'Citizens United'
In its landmark decision of 21 January 2010, 'Citizens vs. Federal Election Commission' (USC 08-205), the US Supreme Court in a 5-4 majority opinion stated that there is no such thing as "too much free speech". 7 One of the dissenting members of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, argued in his dissent that this was a 'straw man argument'; he noted that even under the First Amendment, 'free speech' never included the 'freedom to' say whatever one had in mind (there always had been restrictions on matters such as obscenity); furthermore, the appropriateness of speech (in relation to time, place, and manner) places additional restrictions on this 'freedom to'. The main focus of the dissent was whether free speech included not just physical persons, but also 'legal persons' such as corporations, unions, and ad-hoc associations like 'Citizens United', a gathering of physical persons "united" in an effort to extend 'speaking rights' to entities other than the original persons the Founding Fathers had in mind. In order to secure free speech for what is called 'legal persons', one precisely had to consider them as 'persons', that is, on line with real people.
Remarkably, in the discussions no one seems to have addressed the purely metaphoric character of the term (legal) 'person' when applied to e. g. a corporation. What Justice Stevens did, was to place emphasis on the difference between regular persons ('people') and legal 'persons' (such as corporate entities). Among other things, he maintained that the unique qualities of corporations and other artificial legal entities made them a danger to democratic processes such as elections. These legal entities, Stevens argued, have perpetual life, the ability to amass large sums of money, limited liability, no ability to vote, no morality, no purpose outside profit-making, and no loyalty.
Compared to the persons comprised by the classical expression "We, the people …", and whose voices are heard through the centuries in the Preamble to the US Constitution, as adopted in September of 1787, any modern corporation, when considered legal people, with a right to free speech, will be able to drown out the voices of the real people. The super-rich corporations, through their money, speak louder, and with more frequent timing than what private persons are able to. The corporate voice is heard always and everywhere on the media, in contrast to the feeble output of private individuals and their less endowed entities.
Conclusion
In a fair legal discourse, we should allow the courts to regulate corporate participation in the political process. Minimally, 'free speech' for corporations should not include the freedom to divulge their opinions at times or in manners not appropriate, e. g. by publishing propaganda material for a candidate during the 30-day period preceding an election, as it had been decided in an earlier Supreme Court decision with regard to 'people persons' (cf. the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, the so-called McCain-Feingold bill; Baldino and Kreider 2011: 308) .
What we have seen happen, however, over the past six years, is an unbridled proliferation of corporate sponsoring, either directly to the interested persons or entities, or (especially in the case of so-called 'dark [read: unaccountable] money') through huge donations to so-called PACs, 'political action committees', created with the unique, specific purposes of furthering the candidature of one particular, supposedly corporate-friendly candidate. The immediate results of this development are there for everybody to see, following the 2016 US Presidential election, in which a candidate with a majority of the popular vote was denied victory, thanks mainly to the skillful manipulations of the now legally voiced, corporate 'persons'.
Considering those most often quoted, prime instances of US legal discourse, the First and Second Amendments to the Constitution, it is striking how often the discussions turn around what the original legislators may have meant when they wrote their opinions, as embodied in the Constitution and its later Amendments. In a pragmatic view of legal discourse as not cast in iron, one that is not 'frozen' but 'thawable', it may not always seem uniquely relevant what the Founding Fathers may have thought or intended when they drew up their statutes and amendments. What we are dealing with in current terms is how this legal discourse has developed over time and relative to the spatial context: many of the views and opinions embodied in those hallowed texts have either lost their relevance or are today interpreted differently, in accordance with the current interpreters' (locally and temporally) different points of view -in other words, we are looking at a truly pragmatic issue within legal discourse.
